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I. INTRODUCTION
CYBER deception, which has been widely used by at-tackers for adversarial purposes [1], has recently been
adopted by defenders to enhance cybersecurity [2]. Defensive
deception technologies, such as moving target defense [3] and
honeypots [4], enable a more proactive security posture by de-
ceiving the attackers to act in favor of the defender. Although
case-by-case deception designs have been actively proposed
in various security scenarios under diverse constraints [4], a
unified and quantitative paradigm to understand and design
automated defensive deception is lacking and is the main goal
of this work.
To build the paradigm, we abstract the following common-
alities that underlie various forms of deception scenarios. The
defender as the deceiver has access to the system’s private
information which is unknown or uncertain to the user. The
defender presents manipulated information to the user by
twisting, fabricating, or hiding the private information. The
user, whose incentive is to maximize his utility, acts based
on the received information and his trust of the information.
The defender’s deception goal is two-folded. The first one is
to establish trust in the user and the second one is to mislead
the user’s action to align with the defender’s anticipation to
the greatest extent possible. Three challenges arise from the
design of defense mechanism to achieve the deception goal.
First, since the defender’s and the user’s utilities are generally
not aligned under the same scenario, it is essential to achieve
the tradeoff between establishing trust and misleading actions.
Second, the user can be distinguished into heterogeneous types
based on their targets, resources, and the initial trust level.
The defense mechanism needs to consider the user’s type
which affects the user’s behaviors under the same manipulated
information. Third, the defense mechanism subjects to various
constraints that arise from system implementation, capacity,
and standards. For example, a honeypot can only exhibit
vulnerabilities that are compatible with the system it emulates.
Leveraging the tools from game theory, we propose the
game of duplicity as a paradigm to address these challenges.
The duplicity game is a two-stage Bayesian game between a
defender and a user who has heterogeneous types unknown to
the defender. For example, the user can be either legitimate
or adversarial. At the first stage, the defender can design a
defenise deception mechanism that consists of three essential
components, i.e., a policy generator, a trust manipulator, and
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an incentive modulator. At the second stage, the user observes
the defender’s security policy, updates his initial trust through
the Bayesian rule, and then uses the network based on his type
and the updated trust.
The generator is a mechanism which automatically gener-
ates a security policy based on the system’s private informa-
tion and systemic constraints. For example, the location of
honeypots in a computer network is the private information
that is only known by the defender. The policy generator
in this scenario refers to the honeypot configuration. Under
different configurations, the user observes different sets of
features regarding protocols, TCP/IP fingerprints, ports, and
the response time [5]. These features affect the user’s judgment
of whether a node is a honeypot or not, and elicit different
behaviors of the user. Thus, each set of features can be
viewed as the defender’s security policy which regulates the
user’s behavior. In contrast to the generator which achieves
one-shot deception by imposing a security policy, the trust
manipulator aims to distort the user’s initial belief of the
private information gradually through persistent interactions
with the user [6]. For example, the defender can reduce
the attacker’s alertness by maintaining a low percentage of
honeypot in the long run. Then, the defender receives a high
capture rate of attackers in the honeypot when he increases
the percentage occasionally. Finally, the incentive modulator
reshapes the incentive structures of the players by designing
constrained utility transfers between two players to align
the user’s incentive with the defender’s. For example, the
defender can prolong the authentication time intentionally to
decrease the user’s utility of accessing the honeypot. These
three components of the defensive deception mechanism can
be designed collectively or independently and empower the
defender to harden the security without losing the user’s trust.
Our defensive deception mechanism has three distinctive
features. First, unlike encryption which hides a secret, the
mechanism achieves deception overtly; i.e., the user accepts
the security policy voluntarily as a token of acknowledgment
of potential deception. Second, the mechanism is proactive as
the defender designs deceptive security policies and anticipates
the user’s trust update toward the deception. Third, the mech-
anism is automated and discriminative as the security policies
are generated automatically from the generator and distinguish
different types of users by eliciting different behaviors.
We first analyze the duplicity game through the lens of
mathematical programming. The prime version quantifies the
feasibility and design capacity of the defender’s deception
mechanism. On the other hand, the dual version provides an
alternative interpretation of the deception design problem as a
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2pricing problem for security as a service (SECaaS). Second,
we use the concavification technique [7], [8] to graphically
analyze the defender’s joint design of the generator, modulator,
and manipulator. We analyze both the regulation limitation
of all feasible generators and the regulation efficiency of the
optimal generator. From the user’s side, we show how the
utility alignment of two types of users affects the separability
of their actions. From the defender’s side, we show how the
level of the user’s maliciousness affects the defender’s capacity
to regulate the user’s action. We find that the user’s level of
maliciousness has a threshold impact on the regulatability and
the threshold is 0, i.e., it is the sign rather than the exact
value of the maliciousness level that affects the regulatability.
Finally, we include the joint design of the incentive modulator
and the trust manipulator into the generator design, which
results in two insights for the deception mechanism design.
First, the modulator can be designed independently from the
other two without loss of generality. Second, the designs of
the policy generator and the trust manipulator boil down to the
local and the global initial belief manipulation, respectively.
A. Notations
Calligraphic letter A defines a set and |A | represents its
cardinality. Bold letter p := [p1, · · · , pN ] represents a probabil-
ity vector, i.e., ∑Nn=1 pn = 1. When N = 2, we only need one
element to determine p. With a little abuse of notation, we use
u˜(p1) to represent u˜(p) when N = 2. The defender obtains an
ex-ante utility if the user takes action based on his prior belief.
The defender obtains an ex-post utility after she implements
the deception mechanism to make the user take action based
on his posterior belief.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory has been widely applied to study proactive
and autonomous defense to enhance cybersecurity [9]–[11]. In
particular, evidence-based signaling games [12], [13], dynamic
Bayesian games [14], [15], stackelberg security games [16]
and partially observable stochastic games [17] have been
adopted to study signaling and deception. These incomplete-
information games focus on finding the signals and behav-
iors at the equilibrium under a given mechanism. Restricted
by the applications, the signaling mechanism itself is not
designable and can result in undesired equilibria. In this
work, the designable mechanism empowers the defender to
create additional information advantages besides exploiting the
existing information asymmetry.
Previous works of security-enhancement mechanisms focus
on designing the payoff and allocation rules to incentivize
participants’ behaviors [18], [19]. Our duplicity game further
incorporates the design of information to incentivize the be-
haviors and can be viewed as a generalized class of Bayesian
persuasion games [8], [20] with heterogeneous receivers and
double-sided asymmetric information. Introducing types for
parametrization and differentiation exists in the literature.
Types have been used to model the user’s (i.e., the deceivee’s)
endogenous evidence [21] or prior belief [22], [23] of the state,
which directly affects the signaling mechanism. In [24], the
deceiver can send separate signals to each type of receivers
and in [25], an additional mechanism is introduced to make
the deceivee truthfully report his private type. Comparing to
these works, we adopt deception to achieve a different design
goal of a proactive automated defense mechanism which elicits
different behaviors from heterogeneous users to maximize the
defender’s utility on average.
III. DUPLICITY GAME MODEL
The game of duplicity consists of four elements; i.e.,
the basic game (X ,Θ,A ,u1(·),u2(·)), the belief statistics
(b1(·|x),b(·),b2(·|θ)), the information structure (S ,pi(·|x)),
and the utility transfer (γ,c(·)). The deception is overt as
b1,b2,pi , and the elements of the basic game and the utility
transfer are all common knowledge of the game. In Example
1, we illustrate how our duplicity game can help the defender
to configure the honeypot to discriminate the behaviors of
legitimate and adversarial users and reduce the false positive
rate automatically.
A. Game Elements
The basic game consists of two players i ∈ {1,2}, a
defender i = 1 (hereafter she) and a user i = 2 (hereafter
he). Define the finite sets of state X := {x1,x2, · · · ,xN},
type Θ := {θ1, · · · ,θM}, and action A := {a1, · · · ,aK} where
N := |X |, M := |Θ|, and K := |A | are the number of possible
states, types, and actions, respectively. The defender has a
private access to the value of the state x ∈X . The user has a
private type θ ∈Θ and chooses an action a∈A . The user can
refuse to participate in the game and take no actions, which
is regarded as a feasible action denoted by a0. The utilities of
the defender u1 and the user u2 depend on the values of the
state, type, and action; i.e., ui :X ×Θ×A 7→ R, i ∈ {1,2}.
The belief statistics consists of both players’ prior beliefs
of the state or the type. After observing the state value x ∈X
with probability b(x), the defender presumes that the user’s
type is θ ′ ∈Θ with probability b1(θ ′|x). The user of type θ ∈Θ
presumes that the state is x′ ∈X with probability b2(x′|θ).
Thus, b(·) ∈ ∆X , b1(·|x) ∈ ∆Θ, b2(·|θ) ∈ ∆X are all valid
probability measures for each x ∈X and θ ∈ Θ. The user’s
perceived state distribution b2(·|θ) can be different from the
true state distribution b(·) and he may not know the true state
distribution. Since the defender can affect the belief statistics
of the state gradually through persistent interactions with the
user, we assume that a virtual trust manipulator can control
the distributions b and b2 to the desired values directly and
instantly at the beginning of the game.
The information structure consists of a finite set of security
policies S and a policy generator pi . The defender with state
observation x ∈ X determines the generator pi(·|x) ∈ ∆S .
Then, a security policy s ∈S is imposed automatically and
randomly according to the probability distribution pi(·|x). In
the honeypot example, the defender configures the honeypot
to generate features such as TCP/IP fingerprints and the
response time [5] by choosing the interaction levels and the
services to emulate. The defender may also have the privilege
to disguise a normal server as a honeypot by generating
3honeypot-related features intentionally [26]. Then, the set S
consists of all feasible features and the generator pi refers to
the configurations of both honeypots and normal servers.
The utility transfer consists of a scaling factor γ ∈ [0,∞)
and an action-dependent incentive modulator c : A 7→ R
which adjusts the utility of the defender and the user to be
uˆ1(x,θ ,a) = u1(x,θ ,a)+ γc(a) and uˆ2(x,θ ,a) = u2(x,θ ,a)−
c(a), respectively, for all x ∈X ,θ ∈ Θ,a ∈A . The defender
uses the modulator to incentivize c(a) < 0 or disincentivize
c(a)> 0 an action a ∈A .
Definition 1. An action ak ∈A dominates (resp. is dominated)
under type θ ∈ Θ if uˆ2(x,θ ,ak)≥ (resp. ≤)uˆ2(x,θ ,a) for all
a ∈A ,∀x ∈X .
Definition 1 defines a special utility structure that one action
ak ∈ A brings the most benefit for the user of type θ ∈ Θ
regardless of the state value. If the defender does not redesign
the modulator c, the deception mechanism has no influence
on the user of type θ as he takes action ak consistently for all
generators and manipulators.
B. Game Timeline and Defender’s Design Problem
The timeline of the two-stage game is illustrated in Fig.
1 through the honeypot scenario in Example 1. At stage
one, the defender designs (resp. observes) the distributions
b(·),b2(·|θ),∀θ ∈ Θ, the generator pi(·|x),∀x ∈ X , and the
modulator c if these components can (resp. cannot) be de-
signed. The defender observes the state value x according
to the distribution b and the generator generates the security
policy s randomly according to pi(·|x). At stage two, the user
receives the security policy s and obtains his posterior belief bpi2
by the Bayesian rule whenever possible1; i.e., ∀θ ∈Θ,∀s∈S ,
bpi2 (x|θ ,s) =
b2(x|θ)pi(s|x)
∑x′∈X b2(x′|θ)pi(s|x′)
. (1)
Then, the user determines a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆A to maxi-
mize his expected utility Ea′∼σEx∼bpi2 (·|θ ,s)[uˆ2(x,θ ,a
′)]. Finally,
the user takes an action a∈A according to his strategy σ and
the defender receives a utility of value uˆ1(x,θ ,a). Although
the user can adopt mixed strategies, Lemma 1 shows that the
defender only needs to consider pure strategies of the user to
obtain her maximum utility.
Lemma 1. The user’s optimal strategy is pure.
The proof to Lemma 1 follows directly from the character-
istic of single-player decision problems. The optimal strategy
assigns probability 1 to the action a∗pi,s, which maximizes the
expected utility over the posterior belief bpi2 in (2), and zero
probabilities to all other actions in the set A ; i.e.,
a∗pi,s ∈ argmax
a∈A
Ex∼bpi2 (·|θ ,s)[uˆ2(x,θ ,a)],∀x ∈X ,θ ∈Θ. (2)
Therefore, the user always takes a deterministic action a∗pi,s for
any security policy s ∈ S from the defender. The defender
aims to maximize her post-deception utility
u¯(pi,b,b2,c) := Ex∼b(·)Es∼pi(·|x)Eθ∼b1(·|x)[uˆ1(x,θ ,a
∗
pi,s)] (3)
1If the denominator equals 0 under s′ ∈S , then bpi2 (x|θ ,s′) := b2(x|θ).
by designing the generator, manipulator, and/or the modula-
tor whenever possible. Define the defender’s optimal value
of the deception mechanism as r := maxb,b2,pi,c u¯(pi,b,b2,c).
Different policy generators provide the user with different
amounts of information about the state value and two extreme
generators are defined in Definition 2.
Definition 2. The policy generator pi contains zero informa-
tion if pi(s|x) = pi(s|x′),∀s ∈S ,∀x,x′ ∈X , and full informa-
tion if the mapping X 7→S is injective.
If a generator pi contains zero information, then after re-
ceiving any policy s generated by pi , the user’s posterior belief
is the same as the prior belief, i.e., bpi2 (x|θ ,s) = b2(x|θ),∀s ∈
S ,∀x∈X ,∀θ ∈Θ. On the other hand, any policy from a full-
information generator provides the user with the state value
with probability 1.
Example 1. Theoretically, honeypots are assumed the capacity
to achieve a zero false-positive rate by generating decoys
accessed only by attackers. This assumption can be violated
in practice as legitimate users fail to identify all decoys in a
large-scale and complex network. In the corporate networks,
the security team who implements honeypots does not reveal
their locations to network operators due to a lack of com-
munication or prevention of insider threats [27]. Therefore,
false alarms from normal user activities cannot be eliminated
in production honeypots [28], [29]. Thus, the defender aims
to configure the honeypot to incentivize (resp. disincentivize)
adversarial (resp. legitimate) users to access the honeypot
simultaneously.
In this scenario, the defender determines the percentage
of honeypots, i.e., pH1 ∈ [0,1] to implement in the corporate
network yet releases a public report of the percentage as
pH2 ∈ [0,1]. We assume that users have no additional in-
formation and determine the percentage of honeypots based
on the report. Thus, the true percentage b02(x1) = p
H
1 is
the defender’s private information and the user’s perceived
percentage b02(x1|θ) = pH2 ,∀θ ∈ Θ, is common knowledge.
Since the user does not know the honeypots’ locations, he
does not know the state of each node; i.e., whether the node
is a honeypot, i.e., state x1 or a normal server, i.e., state x2.
However, the user knows in ex-ante that the node is a honeypot
with probability pH2 . The defender does not know whether the
user is of legitimate type θ1 or adversarial type θ2. However,
she can obtain the statistical data of the percentage of le-
gitimate users accessing honeypot nodes qH,g ∈ [0,1] (resp.
normal nodes qN,g ∈ [0,1]) from public researches such as
[30]. Thus, b01(θ0|x1) = qH,g and b01(θ0|x2) = qN,g are common
knowledge. The configurations of the honeypot pi(·|x1) and the
normal server pi(·|x2) affect the probability in which the user
observes the set of features s ∈ S . Each set of features s
observed in each node provides the user the evidence about
the state of the node. Thus, the user can use the evidence
to update the prior belief pH2 of that node’s state and choose
his subsequent action correspondingly, such as whether access
the node, i.e., action a2 or not, i.e., action a1. The defender
can incentivize c(a2) < 0 (resp. disincentivize c(a2) > 0) the
user to access the node by providing monetary rewards (resp.
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Fig. 1: The game timeline of the discriminative honeypot configuration which incentivizes adversarial users and disincentivizes
legitimate users simultaneously to access the honeypot.
prolonging the authentication time intentionally).
IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
We analyze the duplicity game through the lens of math-
ematical programming [31] and concavification [8] in Sec-
tion IV-A and Section IV-B, respectively. The programming
method provides the defender with both a unified method to
design the generator, manipulator, and the modulator collec-
tively and a high adaptability for various security scenarios
by considering additional constraints. On the other hand, the
concavification method provides both an intuitive explanation
through graphs and structural results.
A. Mathematical Programming Perspective
We first elaborate on the relationship between the security
policy and the user’s optimal action to illustrate the meaning of
the security policy. In the honeypot configuration example, the
number of feasible features can be huge and even infinite as
some feature components such as the response time [5] can be
continuous. However, these features can elicit at most |A ||Θ|=
KM action outcomes; i.e., the user’s optimal action a∗pi,s is al
if his type is θ l for all permutations of θ l ∈Θ,al ∈A . Define
alj := a j,∀ j ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, as the j-th element of the action set
A . We can aggregate features based on their elicited action
outcomes and classify all features into KM mutually exclusive
subsets, i.e., S{a1,a2,··· ,aM},al ∈A , l ∈ {1,2, ...,M}. If the user
observes s′ ∈S{a1,a2,··· ,aM}, then his optimal action is al if his
type is θ l ,∀l ∈ {1,2, ...,M}. Without loss of generality, we
can specify |S | := KM,S{a1,a2,··· ,aM} := {s{a1,a2,··· ,aM}} and
s{a1,a2,··· ,aM} serves as a security policy which instructs the user
of type θ l to take action al as his optimal action. In Example
1, there are four possible security policies to regulate the user’s
action based on the type; i.e., the legitimate user accesses the
node while the attacker does not (denoted by s{a2,a1}), the
attacker accesses the node while the legitimate user does not
(denoted by s{a1,a2}), both of them accesses the node (denoted
by s{a2,a2}), and both of them does not (denoted by s{a1,a1}).
Although the user acknowledges the potential deception
embedded in the security policy, he still accepts the security
policy voluntarily as this is the best he can do under the de-
fender’s information advantage of the state value as shown in
(2). Then, the policy generator pi(·|x) under each state x∈X is
a probability distribution over KM security policies and we can
rewrite (2) as follows; i.e., ∀s{a1,··· ,aM} ∈S ,∀ah ∈A ,∀θ l ∈Θ,
∑
x∈X
bpi2 (x|θ l ,s{a1,··· ,aM})[uˆ2(x,θ l ,al)− uˆ2(x,θ l ,ah)]≥ 0. (4)
Plug (1) into (4), we formulate the defender’s design of the
deception mechanism as the following constrained optimiza-
tion problem in the prime version (COP), which is proven to
be feasible and bounded in Theorem 1.
(COP): r = max
b,b2,pi,c
∑
x∈X
b(x) ∑
s{a1,··· ,aM}∈S
pi(s{a1,··· ,aM}|x)
∑
θ l∈Θ
b1(θ l |x)uˆ1(x,θ l ,al)
s.t.
(a). pi(s{a1,··· ,aM}|x)≥ 0,∀s{a1,··· ,aM} ∈S ,∀x ∈X ,
(b). ∑
s{a1 ,··· ,aM}∈S
pi(s{a1,··· ,aM}|x) = 1,∀x ∈X ,
(c). ∑
x∈X
b2(x|θ l)pi(s{a1,··· ,aM}|x)
[
uˆ2(x,θ l ,al)− uˆ2(x,θ l ,ah)
]
≥ 0,∀s{a1,··· ,aM} ∈S ,∀ah ∈A \{al},∀θ l ∈Θ,
(d). c(a1) = 0.
Denote b∗,b∗2,pi
∗,c∗ as the maximizers of problem COP and
r as the value of the objective function under the maximizers.
Constraints (a) and (b) restrict pi as a valid probability mea-
sure. Constraint (c) makes the defender’s deception compatible
with the user’s incentives and thus allows the defender to
deceive covertly; i.e., the user of type θ l can maximize his
benefit by taking al , the action from the security policy.
Constraint (d) represents a capacity constraint of the utility
transfer; i.e., the defender cannot modulate the user’s incentive
if the user does not participate in the game. Although we
do not restrict the utility transfer function to be bounded for
any other actions, Theorem 1 shows that the utility transfer
has to remain bounded to optimize COP due to the user’s
potential threat of taking the drop-out action a0. We can
also incorporate additional systemic and regulatory constraints.
For example, the defender may not have the privilege to
disguise a normal server as a honeypot, i.e., pi(·|x1) is not a
decision variable. Restricted by the evolving regulations [32],
the defender may only hide information but not generate fake
reports, i.e., b2(x|θ) = b(x),∀x ∈X ,∀θ ∈Θ.
5Theorem 1 (Feasibility and Capacity). The defender’s
design problem COP is feasible and bounded. The
upper bound of r is max{maxx∈X Eθ∼b1 [u1(x,θ ,a1)],
r¯ + γ maxa∈A ,θ∈Θ c(θ ,a)} and the lower bound
is r = maxx∈X Eθ∼b1 [mina∈A u1(θ ,x,a)] where
c(θ ,a) := maxx∈X u2(x,θ ,a)−u2(x,θ ,a1).
Proof. Denote a∗,l := argmaxa∈A Ex∼b2(x|θ l)[u2(x,θ
l ,a) −
c(a)],∀l ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, as the optimal action of the user of type
θ l ∈Θ under any feasible prior belief b2(x|θ l) and modulator
c. Then the zero-information generator pi(s(a∗,1,··· ,a∗,M)|x) =
1,∀x ∈X , is a feasible solution to problem COP.
Since b,pi,b1 are all probability measures, r has upper
and lower bounds as r¯ = maxx∈X Eθ∼b1 [maxa∈A u1(θ ,x,a)]
and r=maxx∈X Eθ∼b1 [mina∈A u1(θ ,x,a)], respectively, when
c(a) = 0,∀a ∈ A . The generalization of c as a decision
variable never reduces the value of r as c(a) = 0,∀a ∈ A ,
is always a feasible solution. So now we only need to show
that the generalization does not increase r¯ to infinity. Thus,
we can focus on any action a j ∈ A , if it exists, where the
maximizer c∗(a j) has a non-negative value. If c(θ ,a j) ≤
0,∀θ ∈ Θ, then the drop-out action a1 dominates for all
types and r =maxb∈∆X Ex∼bEθ∼b1 [u1(x,θ ,a1)] is bounded by
maxx∈X Eθ∼b1 [u1(x,θ ,a1)]. On the other hand, if there exists
a type θ ∈Θ where c(θ ,a j)> 0 and the defender chooses to
overcharge the user for taking action a j, i.e., c∗(a j)≥ c(θ ,a j),
then the user of type θ will choose the drop-out action a1.
Thus, the defender does not benefit from the overcharge of
action a j 6= a1 and r≤ γ maxa∈A ,θ∈Θ c(θ ,a). Combining these
two scenarios, we obtain the upper bound of r.
Theorem 1 proves the feasibility of the defender’s deception
mechanism through an integrated design of the generator,
manipulator, and modulator. The upper and lower bounds
further provide a design capacity applied to any duplicity
games. Corollary 1 shows that the existence of the drop-out
action is a necessity for the boundness of r.
Corollary 1. COP is unbounded without constraint (d).
We prove Corollary 1 by letting c(a) equal a constant C0 > 0
for all a ∈ A . Then the value of r has an increase of γC0
and the COP is still feasible. Thus, the defender can achieve
arbitrarily large utility by taking an arbitrarily large C0.
1) Violation of Bayesian Plausibility: The concept of
Bayesian plausibility has been defined in [8], which states that
the expected posterior probability should equal the prior for
all valid pi . However, we show in Lemma 2 that the trust
manipulator can disqualify Bayesian plausibility by making
the user of type θ ∈Θ to hold a different initial belief as the
defender; i.e., ∃x ∈X : b(x) 6= b2(x|θ).
Lemma 2 (Bayesian Plausibility). The user’s expected poste-
rior probability be2(x|θ) := ∑s∈S ∑x′∈X b(x′)pi(s|x′)bpi2 (x|θ ,s)
under any valid generator pi and type θ is always a valid
probability measure yet is Bayesian plausible if and only
if the defender and the user have the same initial belief
b(x) = b2(x|θ),∀x ∈X .
Proof. A valid pi generates security policy s with prob-
ability ∑x′∈X b(x′)pi(s|x′). After receiving s, the user
of type θ obtains his posterior belief bpi2 (x|θ ,s) ac-
cording to (1). Thus, the expected posterior probability
∑s∈S ∑x′∈X b(x′)pi(s|x′)bpi2 (x|θ ,s) is a valid probability mea-
sure over x. The Bayesian plausibility requires be2(x|θ) =
∑s∈S
∑x′∈X b(x′)pi(s|x′)
∑x′∈X b2(x′|θ)pi(s|x′)pi(s|x)b2(x|θ) = b2(x|θ),∀x ∈X , un-
der all valid pi , which is equivalent to the condition b(x) =
b2(x|θ),∀x ∈X .
2) Nonexistence of Incentive Modulator: If the defender
does not have the capacity to change the user’s incentive, then
c(a) = 0,∀a ∈A , and COP can be transformed into a linear
program (LP) by introducing the following new variables, i.e.,
η(s{a1,··· ,aM},x) := b(x)pi(s{a1,··· ,aM}|x),η2(θ ,s{a1,··· ,aM},x) :=
b2(x|θ)pi(s{a1,··· ,aM}|x). These new variables take non-negative
values and satisfy the following new constraints, i.e.,
∑x∈X ,s{a1 ,··· ,aM}∈S η = 1 and ∑x∈X ,s{a1 ,··· ,aM}∈S η2 = 1,∀θ ∈
Θ. After we have solved the new LP, we can obtain the value of
the initial beliefs by b(x) = ∑s{a1 ,··· ,aM}∈S η(s{a1,··· ,aM},x) and
b2(x|θ)=∑s{a1 ,··· ,aM}∈S η2(θ ,s{a1,··· ,aM},x) for all state x∈X .
We present the dual of the linear program (DDP)
and illustrate how it represents a pricing problem for
security as a service (SECaaS). For a more explicit
interpretation, we focus on the case where the defender
cannot design the initial beliefs b,b2. Define shorthand
notation β¯ (s{a1,··· ,aM},x) := b(x)∑θ l∈Θ b1(θ l |x)uˆ1(x,θ l ,al) +
∑ah∈A \{al}∑θ l∈Θλ (s{a1,··· ,aM},θ l ,ah)b2(x|θ l)[uˆ2(x,θ l ,al) −
uˆ2(x,θ l ,ah)] and we obtain DDP as follows:
(DDP) min
β (x),λ (s{a1 ,··· ,aM},θ
l ,ah)≥0 ∑x∈X
β (x)
s.t. β (x)≥ β¯ (s{a1,··· ,aM},x),∀s{a1,··· ,aM} ∈S ,∀x ∈X .
To interpret DDP, we need to introduce an additional player,
the defender’s client, who requires the deception mechanism
as an on-demand security service to regulate the user’s action.
As the service provider, the defender forms her utility function
u1 based on the client’s demand and charges the client a price
β (x) based on the value of the state. The price β (x) consists
of a demand-driven base fee, i.e., ∑θ l∈Θ b1(θ l |x)uˆ1(x,θ l ,al),
based on the client’s expected utility when the user takes action
al and a compensatory fee based on the level of difficulty to
regulate the user to take action al under state x. In particular,
the dual variable λ (s{a1,··· ,aM},θ l ,ah) represents the unit price
to regulate the user of type θ l to take action al rather than ah
under the security policy s{a1,··· ,aM}.
If an action al dominates under type θ l as defined in Defini-
tion 1, then b2(x|θ l)[uˆ2(x,θ l ,al)− uˆ2(x,θ l ,ah)]≥ 0,∀x ∈X ,
for all valid b2, and the user naturally has the incentive to take
action al . In that case, the defender charges the client zero
compensatory fee; i.e., λ (s{a1,··· ,aM},θ l ,ah) = 0,∀s{a1,··· ,aM} ∈
S . On the other hand, if al is dominated under type θ l ,
then the deception mechanism cannot regulate the user to take
action al and the compensatory fee goes to infinity. For all
other cases, the client pays a reasonable unit fee of λ to the
defender for using the deception mechanism and regulating the
user’s action. Meanwhile, the client aims to minimize the total
payment to the defender under various security situations, i.e.,
∑x∈X β (x).
6B. Concavification and Graphic Analysis
Section IV-B1 provides the optimal generator design under
the benchmark case where the defender can neither modulate
the user’s incentive, i.e., c(a) = 0,∀a ∈ A , nor distort their
initial beliefs. In Section IV-B2 and IV-B3, the defender further
incorporates the design of the incentive modulator and the trust
manipulator into the deception mechanism to make the user’s
behavior more regulatable and achieve a higher utility.
Throughout the entire section IV-B, the drop-out action
always exists c(a1) ≡ 0 and we focus on a common prior
belief for the defender and the user, i.e., b2(x|θ) = b(x),∀x ∈
X ,θ ∈Θ to provide a more explicit graphic analysis. Define
p0j := b(x j),∀ j ∈ {1, · · · ,N} and the common prior belief in
the vector form as p0 := [p01, · · · , p0N ]. Since different types of
users have the same initial beliefs, the posterior beliefs are
also the same for a valid generator. Denote p j ∈ [0,1] as the
user’s posterior belief under state x j ∈ X ,∀ j ∈ {1, · · · ,N},
the belief vector p := [p1, · · · , pN ]′, and the utility vector
uˆ2(θ ,a) := [uˆ2(x1,θ ,a), · · · , uˆ2(xN ,θ ,a)]′.
1) Generator Design under the Benchmark Case: As stated
in (2), the user of type θ ∈ Θ aims to find an action to
maximize his expected utility ∑Nn=1 pnuˆ2(xn,θ ,a) = p′uˆ2(θ ,a)
for a given posterior belief p. Thus, we can write the optimal
action a∗θ (p)= argmaxa∈A p
′uˆ2(θ ,a) as a function of p. Since
the user’s expected utility p′uˆ2(θ ,a) is an affine function of
p for any action a ∈ A , maximizing p′uˆ2(θ ,a) over a for
all p in the convex domain ∆X results in a piecewise linear
and convex (PWLC) function as summarized in Lemma 3.
The proof of convexity follows directly from the fact that the
value of a∗θ (p) is the point-wise maximum of a group of affine
functions over p.
Lemma 3. The optimal expected utility of the user of type
θ ∈ Θ, i.e., maxa∈A p′uˆ2(θ ,a), is continuously PWLC with
respect to vector p ∈ ∆X .
We visualize the PWLC property of the user’s optimal
expected utility under a binary state set in Fig. 2. The x-axes
of the circles represent four belief thresholds, 0, pth1 (θ), p
th
2 (θ),
and 1, which divide the entire belief region p1 ∈ [0,1] into
three sub-regions; i.e., the user of type θ takes action aK if his
posterior belief belongs to the sub-region p1 ∈ [0, pth1 (θ)], ac-
tion a2 if p1 ∈ [pth1 (θ), pth2 (θ)], and action a1 if p1 ∈ [pth2 (θ),1].
Although action a3 is not dominated under type θ based on
Definition 1, it is inactive over p1 ∈ [0,1]. We define T (θ) as
the set of the belief thresholds for the user of type θ ∈Θ.
For high dimensional state space N ≥ 2, the user’s entire
belief region p∈ ∆X is a K−1 simplex. For each type θ , we
can divide the entire belief region into at most K sub-regions
C θai := {p≥ 0|p′[uˆ2(θ ,ai)− uˆ2(θ ,a j)]≥ 0,∀a j ∈A ,∑Nn=1 pn =
1},∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, and ∆X = ∪i∈{1,··· ,K}C θai . If the posterior
belief falls into the sub-region C θai , the user of type θ takes ai
as his optimal action. In Fig. 2, C θa0 is the interval [p
th
2 (θ),1]
and C θa2 is the empty set. Lemma 4 shows that all sets C
θ
ai , i ∈{1, · · · ,K}, are convex sets, thus they are also connected. The
proof follows directly from the definition of convexity.
Lemma 4. Sets C θai , i ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, are convex.
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Fig. 2: The expected utility of the user of type θ ∈Θ versus
posterior belief p1 ∈ [0,1] under N = 2 states and K = 4
actions. The solid lines represent the user’s optimal expected
utility maxa∈A ∑Nn=1 pnuˆ2(xn,θ ,a) as a PWLC function of p1.
The set of belief thresholds is T (θ) = {0, pth1 (θ), pth2 (θ),1}.
We have illustrated the belief region partition under any
given type θ ∈ Θ. Since the user has M possible types, we
further divide the belief region into finer sub-regions. Let set
Ca1,··· ,aM := C
θ1
a1 ∩·· ·∩C
θM
aM be the sub-region of the posterior
belief where the user of type θ l ,∀l ∈{1, · · · ,M} takes al as the
optimal action. In particular, define C l,hi, j := C
θl
ai ∩C θha j as the
belief region where the user takes action ai when his type is
θ l and a j when his type is θ h for all i, j ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and l 6=
h,∀l,h∈ {1, · · · ,M}. We can also obtain C l,hi, j by combining all
the Ca1,··· ,aM where al = ai and ah = a j. Since the intersection
of any collection of convex sets is convex, Ca1,··· ,aM and C
l,h
i, j
are all convex and connected sets, i.e., convex polytopes. We
visualize these convex polytopes of a 3-simplex in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: An illustration of 7 convex polytopes Ca1,··· ,aM with
three types M = 3, two actions K = 2, and three states N = 3.
The entire region ∆X is a N−2 simplex, i.e., an equilateral
triangle.
Although there are KM possible sets, i.e., Ca1,··· ,aM ,∀al ∈
A , l ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, they cannot be all nonempty at the same
time. Take N = 2 as an example, K actions can generate
at most K(K − 1)/2 belief thresholds over p1 ∈ (0,1) for
each type as shown in Fig. 2. Thus, the whole belief region
p1 ∈ [0,1] can be divided into at most MK(K − 1)/2 + 1
regions. When N = 3 and the belief region is 1-simplex as
shown in Fig. 3, for each type, K actions representing K planes
can generate at most K(K− 1)/2 lines that can be projected
vertically into the interior of the 1-simplex. Thus, these lines
can divide the 1-simplex into at most MK(K−1)2 (
MK(K−1)
2 +
71)/2= M
2K2(K−1)2+2MK(K−1)
8 belief regions. The results can be
extended to N > 3 as a revise of the hyperplane arrangement
problem [33] where the number of belief region partitions
grows in a polynomial rate of χ(K,M,N) rather than an
exponential rate of KM , which is summarized in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 (Regulation Limitation). For all duplicity games
with feasible generators represented by the vector pi (x) :=
[pi(s1|x), · · · ,pi(sKM |x)], at most χ(K,M,N) elements of pi (x)
are nonzero for all x ∈X where χ(K,M,N) is a polynomial
function of K,M for all N.
Remark 1. If Ca1,··· ,aM = /0 under the given duplicity game,
then it is impossible for the defender to regulate the user of
type θ l to take action al for all l ∈ {1, · · · ,M} by designing
policy generators independently. Lemma 5 illustrates the de-
fender’s regulation limitation for any security scenario; i.e.,
among all |S |= KM potential security policies, the defender
can choose at most χ(K,M,N) policies as the possible output
of the generator to avoid violating the user’s incentive.
The honeypot example motivates a question: whether public
security policies can elicit different actions for different types
of users? If the answer is positive, the deception mechanism
can distinguish between adversarial and legitimate users au-
tomatically. Since each security policy uniquely determines
a posterior belief, we define separability between the user
of type θl and type θh concerning the posterior belief in
Definition 3.
Definition 3. For the given l,h ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and l 6= h, a
posterior belief p∈ ∆X is (l,h)-separable if there exists i, j ∈
{1, · · · ,K} and i 6= j such that p ∈ C l,hi, j .
All the posterior beliefs that are (l,h)-separable comprise
a (l,h)-separable belief region which may not be connected.
Intuitively, the size of the region is reduced as the utilities
of the users of type θl and θh becomes more aligned. Two
utilities are perfectly aligned (resp. misaligned) if they have
the same value (resp. opposite values). Theorem 2 shows that
a scaling of ρ12 (θl ,θh) and a translation of ρ
2
2 (x,θl ,θh) do not
change the separability of the user’s actions under type θl and
type θh.
Theorem 2 (Type Separability). Suppose the user’s utilities
under type θl and θh satisfy a linear transformation; i.e.,
there exists ρ12 (θl ,θh),ρ
2
2 (x,θl ,θh) ∈ R,∀x ∈ X , such that
uˆ2(x,θl ,a) = ρ12 (θl ,θh)uˆ2(x,θh,a)+ρ
2
2 (x,θl ,θh),∀x ∈X ,a ∈
A . Then, no posterior belief p ∈ ∆X is (l,h)-separable if
and only if ρ12 (θl ,θh) ≥ 0; all posterior beliefs p ∈ ∆X are
(l,h)-separable if and only if ρ12 (θl ,θh)< 0.
Proof. For any given p ∈ ∆X , there exists an action ai ∈
A such that ∑Nn=1 pn[uˆ2(xn,θl ,ai)− uˆ2(xn,θl ,ak)] ≥ 0,∀ak ∈
A . Thus, ρ12 (θl ,θh)∑
N
n=1 pn[uˆ2(xn,θh,ai) − uˆ2(xn,θh,ak)] ≥
0,∀ak ∈A . Then the user of type θh at posterior belief p has
the same optimal action ai if and only if ρ12 (θl ,θh)≥ 0.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 implies that if two types of users have
completely opposite (resp. identical) utilities, there exists no
security policies that can elicit them to take the same action
(resp. different actions) under any security scenarios.
Given all the previous structural results from the user’s
side, we are now able to characterize the defender’s optimal
design of the policy generator. We define the defender’s ex-
ante utility under the common prior belief p0 as u˜1(p0) :=
Ex∼p0Eθ∼b1(·|x)[uˆ1(x,θ ,a
∗
θ (p
0)]. Since u˜1 is linear with respect
to p0 inside each convex polytope Ca1,··· ,aM ,∀al ∈ A , l ∈
{1, · · · ,M}, and Lemma 5 provides an upper bound of the
number of different convex polytopes, we obtain the piecewise
linear structure of the defender’s ex-ante utility in Lemma 6.
Since the region is determined based on the user’s ex-ante
utility rather than the defender’s, u˜1 is in general discontinuous
at the boundary of these convex polytopes.
Lemma 6. The defender’s ex-ante utility u˜1 is a (possibly
discontinuous) piecewise linear function of the common prior
belief p0 with at most χ(K,M,N) pieces.
Since the defender can implement generator pi to alter
the user’s prior belief p0 and further the action, we use the
concavification technique introduced in [7], [8] to relate the
defender’s ex-ante utility u˜1 with the ex-post utility u¯(pi,p0)2
defined in (3). Denote the convex hull of function u˜1 as
co(u˜1) and the concave closure V over the entire belief region
∆X as V (p0) := sup{z ∈R|(p0,z)∈ co(u˜1)}. Then, under the
common prior belief p0, the defender’s optimal ex-post utility
is u¯1(pi∗,p0) =V (p0) = r where pi∗ is the optimal generator.
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Fig. 4: Concavification of the defender’s ex-ante utility u˜1
under a binary state space. As denoted by the solid lines,
u˜1(p01) is discontinuous and piecewise linear under three be-
lief regions, i.e., [0, pth1 (θ1)], [p
th
1 (θ1), p
th
1 (θ2)], and [p
th
1 (θ2),1].
The dashed lines represent the concave closure V (p01).
We visualize the concavification process of the binary state
space N = 2 in Fig. 4. Consider a common prior belief
p01 ∈ [pth1 (θ1),1] which is denoted by node ii’s abscissa. If a
generator pi contains zero-information as defined in Definition
2, then the user’s posterior belief p1 is the same as the
prior belief p01, which induces the defender’s ex-post utility
u¯1(pi, p01) = u˜1(p
0
1) denoted by node ii’s ordinate. The defender
can improve his ex-post utility from node ii’s ordinate to at
most node iii’s ordinate by adopting the following generator
pi∗. Generator pi∗ generates two security policies sIV and
sV with proper probabilities for different state x so that the
user’s posterior belief is node iv’s abscissa when observing
policy sIV and node v’s abscissa when observing sV . Since
Bayesian plausibility holds when the defender and the user
2We rewrite function b with vector p0 and omit the independent variables
b2,c of u¯ as they are not designable in the benchmark case.
8share the same prior belief as shown in Lemma 2, the value
of the defender’s optimal ex-post utility u¯1(pi∗, p01) is node
iii’s ordinate where node iii is on the linear interpolation of
nodes iv and v and has an abscissa of p01. The same reasoning
applies to all feasible common prior beliefs p01 ∈ [0,1] and the
defender’s optimal ex-post utility u¯1(pi∗, p01) is represented by
the concave closure V (p01).
Although we need at least |S | = KM signals to represent
all the permutations of actions under different types, Fig.
4 shows that the defender can achieve the optimal ex-post
utility by generating two different security policies in proper
probabilities when N = 2. Corollary 2 generalizes the result
to N > 2 and shows that the generator only needs to generate
sparse security policies to achieve the optimal ex-post utility.
If u˜1(p0) = V (p0) and p0 is further an interior point of any
convex polytope Ca1,··· ,aM ,∀al ∈A , l ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, then there
exists infinite valid generators that achieve V (p0).
Corollary 2 (Regulation Efficiency). For any duplicity game
with common prior belief p0, there exists either one or
infinitely many generators pi∗ that achieves the optimal ex-
post utility V (p0). For any state realization x ∈X , one of the
pi∗ generates at least KM−N security policies with probability
zero.
Proof. Since COP under the benchmark case is a feasible
linear program, the optimal solution is either unique or in-
numerable. If N = 2, the convex hull consists of pieces of line
segments where each line segment can be determined uniquely
by its two endpoints. If N = 3, the convex hull as a polygon
consists of finite pieces of triangles where each triangle can
be determined uniquely by its three endpoints. We can extend
to any finite N where the convex hull consists of pieces of
(N−1)-simplex where each piece can be determined uniquely
by N endpoints. Thus, for any p0 ∈ ∆X , it requires at most
N points to achieve V (p0), which corresponds to N distinct
security policies.
Remark 3. Lemma 5 provides the maximum number of
security policies that can be sent by a generator without
violating the user’s incentive. As a complementary to the
regulation limitation, Corollary 2 illustrates the efficiency of
the defender’s regulation on the user’s action; i.e., a generator
consists of at most N security policies for each state is
sufficient for the defender to achieve the optimal ex-post utility.
In the benchmark version of the duplicity game, the de-
fender designs the generator which regulates the user’s behav-
ior and improves her utility automatically by security policies.
For a given p0 ∈ ∆X , a user is called more regulatable if the
defender’s utility increase V (p0)− u˜1(p0) is larger. Intuitively,
a user can be regulated effortlessly if he is legitimate and
shares the same utility with the defender yet questionably if
he is adversarial and has a completely different utility from the
defender. We introduce a scalar ρ11 ∈ R to measure the user’s
level of maliciousness. A larger negative value of ρ11 represents
a higher level of maliciousness while a larger positive value
of ρ11 represents a lower level of maliciousness. Focusing on
a linear transformation of players’ utilities, we investigate the
relationship between the regulatability and the user’s level of
maliciousness in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Regulatability and Level of Maliciousness).
Suppose that the common prior belief is state-independent, i.e.,
b1(θ |x) = bˆ1(θ),∀θ ∈Θ,∀x∈X , and the defender’s utility is
a linear transformation of the user’s utility, i.e., there exists
ρ11 ,ρ
2
1 (x,θ) ∈ R, such that (5) holds ∀x ∈X ,θ ∈Θ,a ∈A .
uˆ1(x,θ ,a) = ρ11 uˆ2(x,θ ,a)+ρ
2
1 (x,θ). (5)
a. For any prior belief, no valid generators can improve
the defender’s ex-post utility, i.e., u˜1(p0) =V (p0),∀p0 ∈
∆X , if and only if ρ11 ≤ 0. Moreover, zero-information
generators achieve the optimal ex-post utility V (p0) for
all p0 ∈ ∆X when ρ11 ≤ 0.
b. For any prior belief, all valid generators cannot decrease
the defender’s ex-post utility, i.e., u˜1(p0)≤V (p0),∀p0 ∈
∆X , if and only if ρ11 > 0. If p
0 is an interior point of
the (N− 1)-simplex and there exists at least one θ ∈ Θ
under which no actions dominate, then u˜1(p0) < V (p0).
Moreover, full-information generators achieve the optimal
ex-post utility V (p0) for all p0 ∈ ∆X when ρ11 > 0.
c. Fix the values of uˆ1(x,θ ,a),∀x ∈X ,θ ∈ Θ,a ∈ A , the
value of V (p0) under all p0 ∈ ∆X is independent of the
values of ρ11 , ρ
2
1 (x,θ),∀x ∈X ,θ ∈Θ.
Proof. We have proven in Lemma 6 that the defender’s ex-
pected utility u˜1 is a piecewise linear function of the common
prior belief p0 ∈ ∆X . If condition (5) holds, we have
u˜1(p0) = Ex∼p0Eθ∼bˆ1 [uˆ1(x,θ ,a
∗
θ (p
0)]
= Eθ∼bˆ1Ex∼p0 [ρ
1
1 uˆ2(x,θ ,a
∗
θ (p
0))+ρ21 (x,θ)]
= ρ11Eθ∼bˆ1Ex∼p0 [uˆ2(x,θ ,a
∗
θ (p
0))]+Eθ∼bˆ1Ex∼p0 [ρ
2
1 (x,θ)].
Lemma 3 has shown that Ex∼p0 [uˆ2(x,θ ,a∗θ (p0))] is a
piecewise linear and convex function of p0 for all θ ∈
Θ. Since bˆ1(θ) ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ Θ, the linear combination
Eθ∼bˆ1Ex∼p0 [uˆ2(x,θ ,a
∗
θ (p
0))] is also piecewise linear and con-
vex. The term Eθ∼bˆ1Ex∼p0 [ρ
2
1 (x,θ)] is a linear function of p
0.
Thus, u˜1 is a piecewise linear and concave function of p0 if
and only if ρ11 < 0 and a linear function of p
0 if ρ11 = 0. If
u˜1 is concave or linear over the entire belief region ∆X , its
convex hull is itself. Thus, V (p0) = u˜1(p0) for all p0 ∈ ∆X
and the defender should apply a zero-information generator.
Similarly, u˜1 is piecewise linear and convex if and only if
ρ11 > 0. If there exists at least one θ ∈ Θ under which no
actions dominate, then u˜1 is strictly convex over the entire
belief region. Then we have V (p0) < u˜1(p0) when p0 is an
interior point of the (N−1)-simplex.
Theorem 3 shows that when the utilities are linearly trans-
formable, the regulatability depends on the sign of the ρ11
rather than its value, i.e., the maliciousness level. Thus, the
user’s level of maliciousness has a threshold impact on the reg-
ulatability and the threshold is 0. In particular, if the utilities of
defender and the user are zero-sum, e.g., ρ11 =−1,ρ21 (x,θ) =
0,∀x ∈X ,θ ∈Θ, then the defender’s best strategy is to apply
a generator that reveals no information. If their utilities are
completely aligned, e.g., ρ11 = 1,ρ
2
1 (x,θ) = 0,∀x ∈X ,θ ∈Θ,
9then the defender’s best strategy is to apply a generator that
reveals full information to the user.
Remark 4. The benchmark version of the duplicity game
can be transformed into the classical case [8] by revis-
ing the basic game (X ,Θ,A ,u1(·),u2(·)) in the follow-
ing ways. First, the user has a single type and KM ac-
tions denoted by the M-tuple (a1, · · · ,aM) ∈A M :=∏Ml=1A l .
Second, the defender’s utility under action (a1, · · · ,aM) ∈
A M is Eθ∼b1(·|x)[uˆ2(x,θ ,(a
1, · · · ,aM)]. Third, each action
(a1, · · · ,aM) ∈ A M maximizes the user’s utility if and only
if posterior belief p is in the region Ca1,··· ,aM .
2) Incentive Modulator: In Section IV-B1, the defender
regulates the user’s action in her favor by designing the
policy generator. The regulation result depends on two players’
utilities and the user’s action may not always be regulatable as
shown in Theorem 3. Since Theorem 1 shows that introducing
the incentive modulator and (or) the trust manipulator never
decreases the defender’s ex-post utility, we investigate the joint
design of the generator and modulator under the common
initial belief in this section.
𝑝"#$(𝜃") 𝑝"#$(𝜃()
ii
III
iv
V
𝑝"-
𝑢/"(𝑝"-)
10
iii
v
Fig. 5: Concavification of the defender’s ex-ante utility u˜1
when the state space is binary N = 2 and the modulator c
can be designed. Figure 4 is plotted in grey as a comparison.
We replace lowercase Roman numerals with uppercase letters
to illustrate the changes resulted from the design of c.
When the defender can design the modulator c, we visualize
u˜1 under the binary state N = 2 in Fig. 5. The new figure
has the following two main differences from Fig. 4 where the
defender cannot design c. From the user’s side, the modulator
changes the user’s utility based on his action and thus results
in translations of the dashed lines in Fig. 2. Those translations
change the belief region partition, e.g., the right shift of pth1 (θ1)
and pth1 (θ2) denoted by the dashed arrows in Fig. 5. From the
defender’s side, the modulator changes her utility in each new
belief regions by the value of Ex∼p0Eθ∼b1(·|x)[γc(a
∗
θ (p
0))]. If
the defender’s belief is independent of state, i.e., b1(θ |x) =
bˆ(θ),∀θ ∈ Θ,∀x ∈ X , then the defender’s utility change
Ex∼p0Eθ∼b1(·|x)[γc(a
∗
θ (p
0))] = γEθ∼bˆ1(·)[c(a
∗
θ (p
0))] is a con-
stant with respect to p0 in each new belief region. When the
state space is binary as shown in Fig. 5, it means that designing
c introduces translations but not rotations to each piece of
function u˜1 and the translations can be different in the three
new belief regions. Since c(a)≡ 0, the translation is 0 in the
third belief region p01 ∈ [pth1 (θ2),1].
The defender’s optimal modulator design needs to achieve a
balance between the above changes of the user’s belief region
partition and the defender’s ex-post utility. The joint design
of the modulator and the generator results in the new convex
hull denoted by the dashed black lines in Fig. 5. Although the
optimal modulator in Fig. 5 decreases the defender’s utilities
under all actions, i.e., c(a)≤ 0,∀a∈A , the defender’s optimal
ex-post utility V (p01) increases from node iii’s ordinate to
node III’s ordinate under the same common initial belief p01
represented by node ii’s abscissa.
The modulator design depends on the initial belief of the
user and the defender. The optimal modulator for p01 denoted
by node ii’s abscissa is not optimal for other initial beliefs
and can even decrease the defender’s ex-post utility under
other initial beliefs, e.g., u˜1(0) as shown in the Fig. 5. Thus,
the defender can further introduce the trust manipulator in
Section IV-B3 to make the design of the deception mechanism
independent of their initial beliefs and make the user’s action
more regulatable.
3) Trust Manipulator: The design of the manipulator as a
component of the entire deception mechanism can be divided
into two sequential steps. The first step focus on the joint
design of the manipulator and the generator while the second
step further incorporates the modulator design into the joint
design. When the modulator c cannot be designed, the ex-
ante utility u˜1 is determined based on two players’ utilities
and the concavification process results in a unique concave
closure V . Then, the manipulator design is equivalent to the
process of finding the initial belief p0g = argmaxp0∈∆X u˜1(p0)
that achieves the global maximum of the ex-ante utility u˜1 as
shown in Theorem 4. Since u˜1 is piecewise linear as shown in
in Lemma 6, the global maximum of the ex-ante utility u˜1 is
also the global maximum of the concave closure, i.e., u˜1(p0g) =
V (p0g). For example, p0g = [pth1 (θ2),1− pth1 (θ2)] achieves the
global maximum denoted by node v’s ordinate in Fig. 4 and
node v is both on the solid lines and the dashed lines.
Theorem 4. For any given uˆ1, uˆ2, there exists a valid ini-
tial belief p0g ∈ ∆X at the boundary of the convex poly-
topes Ca1,··· ,aM ,∀al ∈ A , l ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, such that p0g =
argmaxp0∈∆X u˜1(p0). The defender’s optimal ex-post utility
for any common initial belief p0 ∈∆X is V (p0g) = u˜1(p0g). The
optimal ex-post utility can be achieved by a zero-information
generator and a trust manipulator which changes the common
initial belief from p0 to p0g.
Proof. For any given uˆ1, uˆ2, the global optimal u˜1(p0g) =
maxp0∈∆X u˜1(p0) exists and has a finite value due to Theorem
1. Corollary 2 shows that the global maximum is either unique
or infinite. In either case, at least one global maximum of the
ex-ante utility is at the boundary of the convex polytopes due
to the piecewise linear property stated in Lemma 6. Since
the defender’s ex-ante utility under the manipulated initial
belief p0g has the same value of the optimal ex-post utility, i.e.,
u˜1(p0g) = V (p0g), the defender implements a zero-information
generator that imposes no additional regulation on the user’s
actions.
In the second step, the joint design of the generator,
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modulator, and the manipulator is equivalent to firstly de-
termining the optimal modulator c∗ that results in the ex-
ante utility function with the largest global maximum, i.e.,
c∗ = argmaxc[maxp0∈∆X u˜1(p0)]. Then, the design problem
with the given modulator c∗ becomes the design problem in
the first step and can be solved accordingly.
Remark 5 (Separable Design of the Modulator). The two-
step design of the entire deception mechanism shows that
without loss of generality, the defender can design the optimal
modulator c∗ independently from the design of the manipulator
and the generator.
Remark 6 (Local and Global Belief Manipulation). Since
the generator design is restricted by the value of the common
initial belief, it can only improve the defender’s utility locally,
i.e., from node ii’s ordinate to node iii’s as illustrated in Fig.
4. On the other hand, the manipulator design can improve the
defender’s utility globally, i.e., from the ordinate of any node
on the solid lines to node V’s ordinate, regardless of the initial
belief. Theorem 4 further shows that if the manipulator allows
the defender to manipulate the initial belief arbitrarily, the
defender no longer needs the generator to regulate the user’s
behavior to achieve her optimal utility. Thus, we obtain the key
insight that the designs of the policy generator and the trust
manipulator boil down to the local and the global initial belief
manipulation, respectively. A joint design of the generator and
the manipulator becomes necessary only in scenarios where
the defender manipulates the initial belief restrictively.
Finally, if the precondition b2(x|θ) = b(x),∀x ∈X ,θ ∈ Θ,
does not hold, then the defender can design her initial belief
and the user’s initial belief separately to achieve a higher
value of the optimal ex-post utility by the joint design of
the generator, modulator, and manipulator. The optimal ex-
post utility can still be achieved by designing a proper trust
manipulator and a zero-information generator as shown in
Theorem 4. The modulator can still be designed independently
as shown in Remark 5. However, constructing u˜1 with the
largest global maximum value is no longer the design goal
due to the violation of the Bayesian plausibility.
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